Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Scorecard for Africa - 2020
It bears restatement that nurses, midwives, and doctors – as well as other emergency and medical personnel from ambulance drivers and paramedics to lab technicians, clinic administrators, and hospital porters – are in the front lines of the fight against Covid-19. Far moreso even than in times of outright war, these personnel across medical disciplines and across the continent are involved in an unprecedented, universalised battle to preserve life. Especially for first responders and first carers, recognition has been widely given that they are undertaking huge personal risks – risks that they might take home to their families – in conducting virus testing, assisting with preventive measures, and health-care of the ill and vulnerable.
We need to especially stress that in this “Year of the Nurse and Midwife” – declared by the WHO in honour of Florence Nightingale, the founder of modern nursing practice – that it is these medical practitioners on whose shoulders the burden of care initially and predominantly falls. Already critical situations have been exacerbated by a brain-drain of medical professionals, caused by a complex set of factors including pull (better remuneration abroad) and push (poor equipment in African treatment centres) elements. Africa as a whole has, according to the WHO, “24% of the [world’s health-care] burden but only 3% of health workers commanding less than 1% of world health expenditure. The exodus of skilled professionals in the midst of so much unmet health need places Africa at the epicentre of the global health workforce crisis.” The Coronavirus epidemic has vastly exacerbated the danger to populations in the majority of African countries that have a critical shortage of health-care providers.
The ratio of nurses and midwives per head of population given in the accompanying table is all the more important given the increasing practice of “task transfer” in which nurses have taken on specific medical interventions normally reserved to doctors alone. Task transfer has been driven both by necessity and by the evolution of health-care policy in different environments. In Africa, where the number of physicians per capita falls well below the global average of 14 doctors / 10,000 people in all but three countries (two of which, Mauritius and Seychelles, are small island states), it has often been by necessity that nurses, particularly in remote rural clinics and even many urban hospitals, have taken on some of the primary medical tasks of junior doctors.
Many countries’ health-care policies attempt to forestall the burden of referral of patient cases to hospitals by doing disease management at nurse-run clinic level. The search for ideal policy frameworks guiding the best distribution of medical resources has also driven task transfer. As noted in a 2019 European Commission study recommending evidence-based task transfer, “Tasks can be shifted from health workers to patients and their carers, to machines, and to other health workers. Where these shifts have been evaluated, they often, but not always, are associated with outcomes that are as good or even better than with the status quo. However,” the study warned, “the results are often context dependent, and it cannot be assumed that what works in one situation will apply equally to another.”
So while most of Africa has a general pattern of critically low medical doctor numbers, for nurses and midwives, the patterns are more differentiated. Still, only two countries (Libya and South Africa), meet or exceed the 2015 global average of 3.42 nurses or midwives / 1,000 people. Given task transfer and the dangerous lack of physicians, this is the professional layer that will need to be the focus of the AU’s African Task Force for Coronavirus (AFTCOR), particularly on the first three of its six technical areas of focus:
- Surveillance, including screening at points-of-entry;
- Infection prevention and control (IPC) in healthcare facilities;
- Clinical management of persons with severe COVID-19 infection.
Medical Doctors Data
Nurses and Midwives Data
 Task Shifting and Health System Design, Report of the Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in Health, European Commission, Luxembourg, 2019, online at https://ec.europa.eu/health/expert_panel/sites/expertpanel/files/023_taskshifting_en.pdf
Governments’ response to COVID-19 has in most cases involved earmarking a significant percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the standard measure of a country’s productive wealth – towards fighting the pandemic. Although this is only part of most governments’ broad-spectrum policy response to the disease, it is an important measure as it indicates governments’ level of commitment to responding to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. It must be stressed, however, that different governments face different levels of severity of the pandemic and different projections (depending on a wide range of conditions including the capacity of their health-care systems, the size, distribution and characteristics of their populations rendered vulnerable by poverty, HIV or other factors, and logistical difficulties in meeting essential needs in facing the crisis.)
Earmarking state funds to fight the pandemic has been done in one of two ways: either governments have increased their health budgets, or they have established specific anti-COVID-19 funds aimed at financing a broader response than health alone. It appears from the accompanying data, derived from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that countries’ response is largely dependent on current budgetary funding as their responses usually focus on 3- to 12-month response plans. Based on the fiscal data, only two countries have estimated (but not yet committed to) the overall response cost to fight Covid-19, namely Togo and Republic of Congo. The differences of approach – budget increase or specific fund, intermediate-term or long-term costings – depends to a degree on considerations including but not only the amount of available foreign aid which can be thrown into the fight.
According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), although the impact of COVID-19 on Africa appears at this stage to be less dramatic, according to reports, than on Europe and North America, the economic impact of the virus in Africa is “disproportionate,” because of its high trade vulnerability to import and export fall-offs due to the pandemic. The continental economy is expected to decline sharply from a 2019 growth rate of 3.2% to 1,8% this year, the loss equivalent to US$29 billion. Predictions are that particularly hard-hit will be oil, tourism, and remittances from African Diaspora communities back to their home countries. In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) is expected to decline, capital is expected to flee the continent’s markets, and those domestic markets will shrink as spending (on all but essentials) as well as spending-power (with job losses) declines. Also, inflationary pressures are expected to grow as supply-chain disruptions create shortages (including of food and pharma) and undermine market value-creation. Of particular concern, according to the UNECA analysis, is a likely increase in national debt as countries borrow to either fund their COVID-19 responses, or to fund stimulus response packages to subsidize flagging economies (another area that Accountability International is tracking).
These factors, along with tax holidays for individuals and businesses, will all negatively affect GDP – and thus the amount of money available to governments to direct to combating the virus. The case of oil-export-dependent countries is worth examining in a little detail. As the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has attempted to stabilize falling oil prices caused by a fall in demand (caused by significantly reduced air and road travel) by slashing production to prevent a glut on the market, African oil producing member countries have followed suit – which means slashing their collective GDP by US$65 billion, UNECA estimates. But the effect of this on their economies differs depending on oil exports as a share of exports – and as a share of GDP.
According to the UNECA data, the top 10 oil producers in Africa in descending importance, based on 2016-2018 annual averages, are:
- Nigeria at US$42,7 billion in oil exports
- Algeria at US$33,9 billion
- Angola at US$33,3 billion
- Libya at US$15,5 billion
- South Africa at US$9,2 billion
- Egypt at US$6 billion
- Equatorial Guinea at US$4,8 billion
- Congo at US$4,2 billion
- Gabon at US$3,2 billion, and
- Ghana at US$3,1 billion.
Of these, the economy of Libya is likely to be hardest-hit by oil revenue losses – on top of the civil war it is experiencing – because while its share of exports is high (88.4%), oil exports’ share of its GDP is the highest of the top ten (62.1%), meaning its economy is poorly diversified and too oil-dependent. The top oil exporter that is least likely to be hard-hit is South Africa with oil exports’ share of total exports relatively low (10.8%) and their share of GDP very low (2.7%), giving it a more diversified economy which is more resilient to oil shocks. Regardless of export losses, however, most governments are protecting their health expenditure, as the IMF notes for Algeria: “In response to the oil price shock, authorities have announced their intention to lower current spending by 30 percent (8% of GDP or USD 15 bn), while keeping wages intact and protecting health and education spending.”
Despite declining GDP, FDI and other financial stimuli, however, African economies are expected to spend an additional US$10,6 billion on health this year to combat the novel Coronavirus. This is a mixed blessing: higher health-care expenditure is certainly needed to flatten the curve of the viral infection and mortality rates – but such massive unplanned expenditure can be expected to reduce spending on other important areas, even within the health sector, such as sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), another key response indicator that Accountability International is assessing to enable clear, evidence-based COVID-19 policy debates.
 It is a little too early to say, but the reported lower incidence of the virus in Africa is probably related to a range of factors including the later transmission of the virus to African countries which enabled the authorities to respond with earlier lockdowns and positive-case detection than in Europe and North America.
 Economic Impact of the Covid-19 on Africa, UN Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 March 2020, online at: https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/stories/eca_analysis_-_covid-19_macroeconomiceffects.pdf
 Policy Responses to Covid-19, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, USA, data as of 10 April 2020, online at: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#A
A significant part of holding leaders accountable in the Coronavirus disease (Covid-19) response is playing a watchdog role in how human rights are protected or trampled by elected leaders in Africa. Some countries have exhibited enduring respect for human rights and this continues under the epidemic response. Others, as you will read below, have been opportunistic and taken COVID-19 as a moment to secure power, suppress opposition and silence civil society.
Out of the 54 countries in Africa for which data is available, 13 of them (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Eswatini/Swaziland, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritania, Saharawi Republic/Western Sahara, Somalia and Tunisia) have instituted no measures to deal with the spread of the epidemic, according to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law’s INCL’s) Covid-19 Civic Freedom Tracker but the other 41 countries (75%) have implemented a variety of measures ranging from a state of emergency to special Covid-19-related decrees. The INCL has no data for Comoros, Mauritius, São Tome and Príncipe, and Seychelles.
With the exception of Eswatini (Swaziland), all Southern African countries have implemented legal measures to cope with the spread of the pandemic. In all cases, freedom of assembly has been severely restricted with citizens confined to their homes, and only permitted to travel short distances in order to obtain food, medical assistance, or to deliver essential services. Public gatherings have been limited to less than 100 people, in some cases 50 and, in the cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe to five and two people, respectively.
Human rights activists, policymakers, philanthropists, and public health professionals should pay attention to whether a country’s official response to the novel Coronavirus disease is based on a special act of parliament – in other words, where the response has been scrutinized and endorsed by political parties not in power – or whether based on an order grounded in regulatory, including emergency, powers vested in various government ministries and departments. The rapid onset of the pandemic has seen numerous instances of contradictory rules being issued by different ministers – and also of officials on the ground, especially police, misinterpreting or exceeding their proper remit.
It is important to note that where national authorities overstep the mark in their application of emergency responses to Covid-19, or where civil servants exceed their powers, the people targeted as a result are very often marginalized and excluded populations: women and girls, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer (LGBTIQ) persons, people who use drugs, sex workers, people who pass through prisons and other places of detention, migrants and displaced people, refugees, the elderly, the mentally ill, people living with disabilities indigenous people, civil society activists, journalists, and perceived political opponents. To these must be added, as victims of prejudiced Covid-19 responses, the economically excluded because the poor generally are rendered additionally exposed to the virus as a result of inadequate access to decent health-care and sanitary living conditions. Some of these communities have also been demonized by officialdom or sectors of civil society for supposedly spreading the virus.
Key areas of concern:
Press Freedom and Freedom of Expression
Several countries have instituted measures restricting press freedom and freedom of expression under the guise of stamping out disinformation or “fake news” relating to the pandemic and to the state’s response programme. While a number of these already had restrictive laws in this regard and have shut down civic spaces even further (Egypt, Zimbabwe, Morocco: for example, the Moroccan Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports has suspended the publication and distribution of print newspapers until further notice), it is very alarming that relatively open, democratic societies such as South Africa and Ghana have also seen fit to follow suit with punitive measures on freedom of expression.
Zambia’s ruling party has apparently used the outbreak of Covid-19 to settle political scores, closing down The Post newspaper and Prime TV; both media houses are perceived to be supportive of the opposition, and in the case of the television station, it was shut down for allegedly having refused to carry government Covid-19 announcements. In Tanzania on 20 April, journalist Ussi Hamad with the daily Daim a newspaper was suspended from work for six months for merely reporting on the pandemic; this came days after the Mwananchi daily newspaper had its online license suspended for posting a picture of President John Pombe Magufuli shopping, surrounded by people, which provided a debate on social distancing. Meanwhile, Egyptian authorities have expelled journalist Ruth Michaelson of The Guardian after she reported that Egypt has far more coronavirus cases than have been officially reported. In Ethiopia, a months-long internet shutdown in parts of the country aimed at curbing the Oromo separatist group has prevented millions of Ethiopians from accessing information about the pandemic.
Curbs on freedom of expression are keenly felt by artists and cultural workers who are either unable to make a living or travel to safe residencies as a result of lockdowns during the crisis. Also, such creatives are important interpreters of social realities for their communities and broader national societies, so any critiques they produce of state responses to the pandemic are likely to fall foul of emergency rules that curb free expression. Free press and expression and arts rights justice campaigners continue to monitor such issues.
Reports of heavy-handed enforcement of the regulations, including, in some cases extrajudicial killings, by police, army, and security force personnel have been recorded in a number of countries. In South Africa, there have been eight deaths reported at the hands of the police enforcing the lockdown, and there have been many more instances of the police and army subjecting citizens to assaults and degrading treatment for allegedly being in breach of containment regulations. Reports are also emerging of a similar pattern in Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Nigeria, Kenya, the DRC, Senegal, and Uganda.
Prisons and refugee camps
Public health authorities have warned that prisons are one of the greatest risks for the spread of the virus because of the manner in which prisoners are kept in confined spaces. In Africa this risk is further exacerbated by the well documented overcrowding of prisons across the continent, but to date few African countries have released awaiting-trial prisoners or those incarcerated for minor non-violent offences. However, on 5 April, King Mohammed VI of Morocco pardoned 5,645 prisoners in a bid to curb the spread of the virus by alleviating overcrowding, though the prisoners were not released wholesale, but rather in phases based on factors such as their youth and conduct. This represents 7,05% to be released of Morocco’s reported incarcerated population of 80,000 (two of whom tested positive), and 10,200 warders (nine of whom have tested positive). Ethiopia has released 4,000 prisoners, while Cameroon has also announced a limited release of prisoners – excluding those accused of terrorism, separatism and other serious offences.
Amnesty International demanded that authorities in Sub-Saharan Africa “must take urgent action to protect people in detention from Covid-19 including releasing prisoners of conscience, reviewing cases of pre-trial detention, and guaranteeing access to healthcare and sanitation products in all facilities.”
Many of the same concerns relating to prisons can be applied to another form of unfree detention – that experienced by migrants in the continent’s massive refugee camps in countries as diverse as Chad, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Zambia. Because of rudimentary health and sanitation facilities, these camps, which often host tens or even hundreds of thousands of refugees, are exceptionally vulnerable to respiratory infections such as influenza and, if their residents are provided with inadequate health-care could become new epicentres of the pandemic. Most early results of pilot tests regarding the possible transmission of the Covid-19 virus via feces have proven negative, yet implementing Sustainable Development Goal 6, access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), as well as public campaigns for people to regularly wash their hands, will prove critical here. Sudan alone had 1.86 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of July 2019, and the African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) has called on both the authorities and separatist rebel groups to jointly under UN auspices come up with an action plan to ensure non-discriminatory inclusion of these displacees in health-care provisions during the epidemic, including access to adequate information on combating the spread of the virus.
In Angola, Amnesty International has reported that NGO workers were assaulted and arrested by security forces when they attempted to deliver health information and essential hygiene products to San communities in the remote parts of Cuando Cubango province. In general, indigenous communities across the continent, from the San in the Kalahari to the Amazigh in Morocco’s Atlas Mountains, report that they have been neglected in the Covid-19 response, owing to their lack of resources, lack of access to basic healthcare, water and sanitation, their geographic remoteness, as well as institutionalised discrimination.
In fact activists and health care workers have been bemoaning the lack of guidelines for health-care personnel on how to continue standard care and visits to remote indigenous communities in the face of the epidemic, as visits to these communities might perpetuate an outbreak in these areas. Some hypothesize these communities may have lower resistance due to lower exposure to coronaviruses generally, which would make them additionally vulnerable to discriminatory health practices. The Indigenous Peoples of Africa Co-ordinating Committee, a network covering 22 countries, warned that while lockdowns appeared effective, they could not be imposed against indigenous peoples because of their nomadic lifestyles.
Communities such as the LGBTIQ community that are already marginalized and vulnerable due to a range of factors including poverty and discrimination, now face further challenges during the pandemic; many are in fact rendered even more at-risk due to the response of authorities under emergency regulations. A now well-known example is that on 29 March on the outskirts of Kampala, Uganda, when the police raided a shelter and arrested 14 gay men, four transgender women, and two bisexual men, charging them with breaking social distancing rules (set at a maximum of 10 people and since reduced to five); equal rights campaigners have countered that the arrests were motivated by homophobia and transphobia and not the emergency regulations.
Concerning reports are emerging that several Southern African states (Botswana, South Africa, Zambia, and Namibia) are deporting hundreds of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants back to Zimbabwe under the guise of quarantine requirements. Given the history and continuation of human rights abuses occurring within Zimbabwe and a shortage of food, water and sanitation within the country, this is a serious issue that undermines the desired inclusiveness of universal access to health-care.
Lastly, it worth noting that the pandemic is, in some parts of the continent, happening in a context of armed conflict. The pandemic is likely to exacerbate and fuel some conflicts: for example, Islamic militants have now (April 2020) launched a fresh offensive in northern Mozambique.
While many African countries have launched epidemic prevention measures, a few have taken the opportunity afforded by the necessary emergency response to the pandemic to achieve ulterior aims. Human rights abuses are occurring across a broad spectrum and these need to be monitored closely. Of particular concern are the economic effects of lockdown and other quarantine measures on economic development and social stability. If social unrest from hunger or disease occurs, there is a possibility of heavy-handed responses from various states. Africa’s governments need to be held accountable through active dialogue in this time of crisis with a broad range of stakeholders to ensure an inclusive health-care response is backed up by respect for universal human rights.
 Covid-19 Civil Freedom Tracker, International Center for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL), online at: https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker/?location=&issue=&date=&type=
* We have not here differentiated between Somalia and the self-administered yet unrecognized region of Somaliland but are tracking responses to the pandemic under both administrations.
Preventing Mass Famine of the Marginalized: Fiscal Stimulus Packages and Accountability
The impact of COVID-19 is clearly not restricted to medical, health-care, vaccinology, and epidemiological concerns, but has an unprecedentedly broad impact on the global economy and its national and sub-national components. In a dire warning by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the “Great Lockdown” as it has become known in many quarters, is projected in even a best-case scenario to, in the intermediate term, be the most severe world recession since the Great Depression of 1929-1939. It is therefore imperative that African governments’ dialogues with their constituents, including organized labour, formal and informal sector business, and civil society, on how best to rescue their flagging economies urgently need to be transparent, innovative, and above all inclusive to ensure that starvation due to commercial shuttering and economic shrinkage does not provoke widespread famine.
On April 22, 2020, World Food Program (WFP) chief David Beasley told the UN Security Council that even before the onset of COVID-19 he had warned world leaders that “2020 would be facing the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II” because of factors including “deepening crises in places like South Sudan and… Burkina Faso and the Central Sahel region. The desert locust swarms in Africa… and more frequent natural disasters and changing weather patterns. The economic crisis in… DRC, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the list goes on. We’re already facing a perfect storm.” The WFP chief said that “821 million people go to bed hungry every night all over the world, chronically hungry, and as the new Global Report on Food Crises published today shows, there are a further 135 million people facing crisis levels of hunger or worse. That means 135 million people on earth are marching towards the brink of starvation. But now the World Food Programme analysis shows that, due to the Coronavirus, an additional 130 million people could be pushed to the brink of starvation by the end of 2020. That’s a total of 265 million people.”
Stating that the “magnitude and speed of collapse in activity that has followed is unlike anything experienced in our lifetimes,” the IMF’s Gita Gopinath in announcing its April edition of quarterly World Economic Outlook, took the position that assuming “that the pandemic and required containment peaks in the second quarter for most countries in the world, and recedes in the second half of this year… we project global growth in 2020 to fall to -3 percent.” That compares very unfavourably to the worst economic shock of recent times, the 2009 financial crisis provoked by the sub-prime housing scam in the USA, in which global growth only fell to -0,1% of real annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth. “Assuming the pandemic fades in the second half of 2020,” Gopinath wrote, “and that policy actions taken around the world are effective in preventing widespread firm bankruptcies, extended job losses, and system-wide financial strains, we project global growth in 2021 to rebound to 5.8 percent. This recovery in 2021 is only partial as the level of economic activity is projected to remain below the level we had projected for 2021, before the virus hit. The cumulative loss to global GDP over 2020 and 2021 from the pandemic crisis could be around 9 trillion dollars, greater than the economies of Japan and Germany, combined.”
But in a worst-case scenario, Gopinath warned: “The pandemic may not recede in the second half of this year, leading to longer durations of containment, worsening financial conditions, and further breakdowns of global supply chains. In such cases, global GDP would fall even further: an additional 3 percent in 2020 if the pandemic is more protracted this year, while, if the pandemic continues into 2021, it may fall next year by an additional 8 percent compared to our baseline scenario.” Such a combined 14% drop would make it scarily close to the Great Depression’s 15% fall – the aftermath of which endured for a decade. While emerging markets and developing economies such as those in Africa are expected to collectively suffer smaller annual GDP growth declines than the more precipitate drop expected in the developed world, the IMF’s data for 2019 and its best-case scenario projections for 2020, and 2021 respectively for Sub-Saharan Africa are: 3,1%; -1.6%; bouncing back to 4.1%. For two key economies on the African continent, those 2020 and 2021 predictions are Nigeria -3.4% recovering to 2.4%, and South Africa -5.8% springing up to 4%.
In an attempt to rescue their economies, most countries have implemented emergency financial stimulus packages of one kind or another. These are baskets of financial regulatory interventions by governments and central banks that help boost flagging economies. Normally, they involve complex interpretations of a fairly simple equation: boosting government spending to improve liquidity (the amount of cash in circulation) thereby stimulating the economy as people have more spending power, so increased demand drives production.
In the COVID-19 response scenario, however, there are two differentiated responses that we have seen in Africa:
- in non-oil-export-dependent states, government spending is increased, particularly in health-care: either by subsidizing health-care, raising health-care funding, or creating a special COVID-19 fund; and
- in oil-export-dependent countries, government spending is actually reduced, particularly in imports of non-pharmaceutical, non-food, and non-essential items, while health-care expenditure is either maintained or raised.
Fiscal stimulus packages can also be divided into support for finance, business, and industry and for households and individuals, and thus ranges from boosting liquidity to ensure there is more cash in circulation to compensate for the fall in production and earnings, to subsidizing worst-hit sectors of the economy (particularly manufacturing, retail, hospitality, travel, and tourism, and the freelance and informal sectors), boosting unemployment benefit funds or subsidizing wages for workers standing idle under lockdown, VAT and interest rate cuts to increase spending power, and a range of debt relief measures (housing and vehicle finance, and life, retirement and medical aid repayment suspensions or deferral).
These packages can be enormously expensive, however, so the UN Economic Commission for Africa has warned about the additional debt burden this will place on Africa’s emerging economies if they have to borrow to raise the money. For example, South Africa will implement a ZAR50 billion (US$26,6 billion) fiscal stimulus package, while Nigeria has made US$128,4 million available to rescue its oil-dependent economy – whereas the UN Economic Commission for Africa warns that these countries are already saddled with debt as a percentage of GDP of 55,9% (South Africa) and 55,8% (Nigeria).
So far, it seems the most common financial rescue plans across Africa, select elements of which are noted on the accompanying qualitative table, focus on maintaining payments to workers or subsidizing wages, on freeing up capital to increase market liquidity, and interest rate cuts to improve consumers’ borrowing and buying power. But there is a worrying lack of relief where one would expect it, aimed at the citizenry: “debt holidays,” the temporary suspending or rescheduling of home rental, life, and medical aid payments, and of repayments of loans on homes and vehicles; instead it is feared much emergency support is rather tailored to assist the financial sector and big business, and to further empower the security forces. Clearly these forms of relief, combined with increased spending on, or the creation of social grants (such as old age pensions, disability benefits, assistance for child-headed households, and benefits for unemployed or laid-off workers) should be a key intervention. At the point of the IMF’s measurement (8-16 April 2020) on which our table is based, only 16 out of 54 countries (29%) were providing some form of tax relief. Also, it must be noted that even sound fiscal stimulus packages require adequate implementation – and capacity-building for such implementation if required.
However, of the biggest challenges of fiscal stimulus packages – like that of health-care provision itself – is that of including marginalized populations, especially the poor. According to an International Labour Organization report, in Africa, 85.8% of employment is in the informal sector. In South Africa to cite but one example, the indigenous crafts and curios market alone contributed ZAR11 billion (US$585,6 million) to GDP and employed about 38,000 people – compared to to ZAR2,63 billion (US$139,8 million) and 44,000 jobs in fishing. Living subsidies and feeding and other emergency assistance schemes for the informal sector – denied the ability under containment measures to trade in public markets and often unable to access its traditional supply and sales routes – are critical to the wellbeing of traders and the extended networks of people who survive on their earnings.
Poverty is a cross-cutting driver of vulnerability and marginalization in all societies, especially unequally disadvantaging women and girls who already have lower earning power, and people such as migrants, the mentally ill, people living with disabilities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer persons (LGBTIQ) who were even in pre-COVID-19 circumstances pushed to the margins of economic activity. As the WFP’s Beasley stated: “The economic and health impacts of COVID-19 are most worrisome for communities in countries across Africa as well as the Middle East, because the virus threatens further damage to the lives and livelihoods of people already put at risk by conflict.”
Warning that death rates from starvation alone could soar to 300,000/day over the next three months if WFP emergency assistance proved unequal to the task, he stressed: “if we don’t prepare and act now – to secure access, avoid funding shortfalls and disruptions to trade – we could be facing multiple famines of biblical proportions within a short few months.” So while fiscal stimulus packages are supposed to even-handedly help both households and high finance, governments need to transparently engage in dialogue about how to uplift their largest vulnerable population group, the poor.
 Gita Gopinath, The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression, International Monetary Fund Blog: https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-the-great-depression/
 WFP chief warns of huger pandemic as CVID-19 spreads, World Food Program, 22 April 2020: https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-chief-warns-hunger-pandemic-covid-19-spreads-statement-un-security-council
 2020 - Global Report on Food Crises, World Food Program: https://www.wfp.org/publications/2020-global-report-food-crises
 World Economic Outlook, April 2020, International Monetary Fund: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020
 Economic Impact of the COVID-19 on Africa, UN Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 March 2020, online at: https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/stories/eca_analysis_-_covid-19_macroeconomiceffects.pdf
 Given the required rapid evolution of government responses, this is likely to change swiftly from the date of this measurement, however.
 More than 60 Percent of the World’s Employed Population are in the Informal Economy, International Labour Organization, 30 April 2018: https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_627189/lang--en/index.htm
 South African Department of Arts & Culture statistics 2011-2012, the latest available figures.
Risks of Sexual & Gender-Based Violence under COVID-19
Movement restrictions imposed in response to COVID-19 have already resulted in a deadly increase in reported sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), especially intimate partner violence experienced in the home. Such restrictions include rules of full “lockdown” in which all but essential/emergency travel is outlawed, and “curfew” in which travel by the general public is restricted to certain daylight hours. These restrictions have been enforced in varying degrees of severity, but in many African countries have seen much of the population being cooped up in the close confines of their homes for unusually long periods of time. The psychological toll of living at close quarters has combined with other stresses, particularly job losses caused by the pandemic, to produce volatile domestic conditions.
In positive contrast, there is early statistical evidence that the shutting down of much public social life and the increased security force presence on the streets has seen a sharp decrease in sexual crimes such as rape committed in public spaces by perpetrators who are unknown to their victims. Yet in parallel, there is the risk that helplines and shelters for sexual and gender-based violence will become understaffed – either as a result of helpline services being suspended because staff are viewed as non-essential and are not allowed to go in to work or are redeployed to assist in fighting the pandemic, or as shelters are shut down as potential incubators of the virus. In African countries with alarming rates of SGBV, extra consideration must therefore be given to whether undifferentiated lockdown or curfew policies serve the greater good.
Here we will look at a range of gender-related issues under COVID-19, and have separated out a snapshot study of a case in which an alcohol and tobacco sales ban has had mixed results under a total lockdown regime. We will emphasize that a nuanced and inclusive, rather than one-size-fits-all (and thus unintentionally exclusionary) response to the pandemic will help alleviate the danger posed to vulnerable groups, especially women, girls, and LGBTIQ communities, as well as groups that are discriminated against or criminalized.
An increase in SGBV has already been observed in countries as socially diverse as France, Argentina, and Singapore, where reported incidents increased by 25% to 33% since the outbreak of COVID-19. Domestic violence as also increased dramatically in China, where reported cases have tripled during lockdown. Research prior to the Coronavirus disease outbreak had already demonstrated that in Africa, the occurrence of sexual and gender-based violence varied greatly per country, and so different outcomes of COVID-19-related restrictions in each country are to be expected. Prior to COVID-19, in Equatorial Guinea, for instance, 44% of women between the ages of 15 and 49 had experienced intimate partner violence, whereas in The Gambia, only 7% had (see Table 1). The Ebola outbreak in West Africa in late 2013 provides a deeply worrying prior pandemic-response example, for violence against women soared – while at the same time, it was reported that SGBV was deprioritized, unrecognized, or ignored.
Importantly, stigma and discrimination against LGBTIQ people has seen many of the members of this community reporting higher levels of physical, sexual, and emotional violence during the COVID-19 pandemic. Experiences range from being forced to go and stay with family that are homo-, lesbo-, or trans-phobic, to being denied food or a place to stay, or suffering abusive behavior. Job losses under the pandemic, or insecure accommodation arrangements have forced many to move in with partners, or even ex-partners because of the lack of alternative places to stay. Social discrimination, which had already placed such people in a precarious position prior to the COVID-19 crisis, has seen them put under even more severe stress during the pandemic, yet few local authorities have rallied to support them. In Africa, it has been mostly the LGBTIQ community itself and its allied civil society organizations that have provided support, and some funding and relief.
Differences between African countries in their experiences of sexual and gender-based violence could also be a reflection of the capacity of these states to collect relevant data. Evidence-based research still falls short in many African countries, which limits the capacity of governments to make adequately data-driven decisions. The African Population Health Research Centre has advocated for better coordinated systems to collect data on social welfare, an objective pursued by Accountability International and many other NGOs working in the health-access sector. Another challenge is that sexual and gender-based violence is often committed behind closed doors – and it is not even criminalized in many countries, as is frequently the case with marital rape. Therefore, a full picture of the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on SGBV in Africa is unlikely to emerge, even well after the storm has passed. Pre-pandemic data, however, shows the canvas on which incidents during the crisis will be painted.
African Heads of State have been largely silent on the looming threats, despite the dire warnings from the UN and civil society for government to put special measures in place that protect women, girls, and LGBTIQ people. For example, an African Union (AU) Bureau of Heads of State and Government communiqué on the African response does not mention SGBV or gender once, nor does it speak to concerns about the effects of restrictive movement measures on these vulnerable and marginalized groups.
Although the risk of gender-related violence in intimate social circles will undoubtedly increase under COVID-19 constrictions, the imposition of effective lockdowns or curfews, taken together with an increased security force presence, can have a different impact on other gender-related crimes, such as rape and sexual assault where the perpetrators and victims are unknown to each other, or do not habitually reside together. Pre-COVID-19 data from showed that in Sub-Saharan Africa, non-partner sexual violence has been documented in 14,8% of all women between the ages of 15 and 49, which is substantially higher than Europe (9,8%), Latin America (10,2%), and Asia (5,3%). Although COVID-19 restrictions may potentially lessen this threat, the UNFPA warned that violence may magnify in vulnerable populations.
In South Africa, non-partner violence appears to have decreased since the outbreak of COVID-19, due to suppressed social and street activity, heightened police visibility, and the reinforcement of the police by 73,000 soldiers in enforcing an initial 35-day full lockdown (none but emergency/essential travel over 27 March to 30 April). A week after their lockdown policy came into effect, the number of reported rapes had declined by 86% (a decrease of 598 cases). However, there were 2,300 reported cases (in a population of 58,7 million people) of sexual and gender-based violence within the first week of lockdown in South Africa, which emphasizes that statistics don’t always reveal the full picture. Therefore, when looking at the risks that COVID-19 policies can pose relating to SGBV, the focus should primarily be on intimate partners and close social and household circles.
The COVID-19 pandemic is exposing many underlying inequalities in socio-economic systems in Africa, of which sexual and gender-based violence is a primary one. Gender discrimination should be considered in every response to this unprecedented public health crisis. The pandemic is still in its early stages, which allows countries the opportunity to address sexual and gender-based violence, empower women, girls, and LGBTIQ persons, and include them in finding solutions. Agencies such as UN Women and UNFPA have already developed guidelines to incorporate gender considerations into national responses to COVID-19. Primarily, governments must ensure that services to prevent and treat SGBV, such as emergency helpline services and domestic violence shelters, remain available not just to women and girls who are considered socially acceptable, but also to other groups who are discriminated against, for example, women who use drugs, trans-diverse people who sell sex, and queer people who are homeless. The LGBTIQ community must be equally included in the provision of services to combat both SGBV and COVID-19, and this must be up front and central and not done in an ad hoc manner.
The public should be sensitized and educated to prevent SGBV that occurs as a result of discrimination and stigma of any kind, fear of infection, restriction of movement, or economic unrest. We further emphasize that national health institutions should make an effort to engage in transparent and honest dialogues with communities whose marginalization is based on sexual orientation and gender identity and expression – and to collect data on the direct and indirect impacts of COVID-19 on sexual and gender-based violence, to better understand and address how policy decisions impact vulnerable members of society differently.
Snapshot: SGBV & restricted substances in South Africa under lockdown
Because South Africa has one of the most comprehensive COVID-19 responses on the continent, it presents an interesting possible case study – presented here in a brief snapshot – of the complex ways in which lockdown policies interact with sexual and gender-based violence. But it must be cautioned that the country also boasts a better capacity to deal with the pandemic than most other African countries, so this should be taken not as an average, but rather as an extreme example. As mentioned in the main piece, a decrease in non-partner was observed, but a substantial increase in intimate-partner and close-family violence is expected. South Africa has also instituted bans on the sale of alcohol and tobacco products, and has reinforced this policy vigorously. Alcohol consumption is known to increase domestic violence and the ban can therefore help to reduce SGBV, but unintended side-effects of the policy need to be taken into consideration. First and foremost, the ban on alcohol and tobacco has provoked much anger, particularly amongst consumers who have become heavily reliant on these products.
As a result, many people started to engage in home brewing, which poses additional health risks such increased accessibility of poor-quality (and even life-threatening) raw and high-proof alcohols. It also brings with it considerable legal, and physical risks, because the ban has encouraged security forces to act with a heavy hand. An additional concern is for the mental health of alcoholics who depend on substance abuse as a coping mechanism. Even in instances where people are so-called functioning alcoholics and have an addiction during specific contexts or times, a sudden and unprepared lack of access to alcohol could increase withdrawal symptoms such as depression and anxiety. And for people who have alcohol use disorder, in some cases a non-controlled withdrawal can even cause death (delirium tremens). Hence, the ban on alcohol during COVID-19 will undeniably prevent many instances of sexual and gender-based violence, but it may easily provoke numerous others.
Lockdowns and curfews have also disrupted illicit drug supplies, with similar concerns for the mental health of drug-dependent persons and the physical safety of those living in close confines with them. The relative inaccessibility of tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drugs has a particular relevance for the trans-diverse community where these substances are significant factors in coping with prejudice and exclusion. For instance, the LGBTQ community consumes 50% more tobacco than the general population, so they are more likely to seek illegal sources of tobacco. Furthermore, most trans-diverse people have experienced discrimination when attempting to access health-care, sometimes being denied of services completely, which could increase their reluctance to seek medical help during the pandemic. Another concern is that trans-diverse people might be forced back into living with their families during lockdown periods, where they will be more vulnerable to people that do not accept them. In places where LGBTQ rights are still absent or homosexual relationships are illegal, which is the case in many African countries, the pandemic will indubitably make their lives even more difficult.
 Wanqing, Domestic violence cases surge during COVID‐19 epidemic, Sixth Tone, 2020: https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1005253/domestic-violence-cases-surge-during-covid-19-epidemic
 Global Health Observatory data repository.
 Communiqué of the AU Bureau of Heads of State and Government teleconference meeting, 3 April 2020, online at:
 Significant reduction in crime since lockdown, South African Government News Agency, 5 April 2020: https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/significant-reduction-crime-lockdown
 South African police record 2,300 gender-based violence complaints in first week of lockdown – not 87,000, Africa Check, 9 April 2020: https://africacheck.org/spot-check/south-african-police-record-2300-gender-based-violence-complaints-in-first-week-of-lockdown-not-87000/
 What Works to Prevent Violence, Violence Against Women and Girls in Conflict and Humanitarian Crises. (2017). No Safe Place: A Lifetime of Violence for Conflict‐Affected Women and Girls in South Sudan. Retrieved March 30, 2020, from https://globalwomensinstitute.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs1356/f/downloads/No%20Safe%20Place_Summary_Report.pdf
 Buchting et al. (2017) Transgender use of cigarettes, cigars, and e-cigarettes in a national study. American journal of preventive medicine 53(1): e1-e7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2016.11.022
'Doing what we do best: Using facts and scorecards to build Transparency, Dialogue, and Action in the response to COVID-19 in Africa!'
With over 207,000 people dead and over 3 million people testing positive for the novel Coronavirus[i] and the International Monetary Fund predicting the most severe global recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s and the World Food Programme the most severe famine since World War II, the global COVID-19 pandemic has become a pivotal moment in human history where equal access to health-care has become internationally recognised as an urgent priority.
The African continent, with its already challenged health care systems, is only now starting to see the first cases of local transmission and the statistics of both new infections and death rates are alarming. Added to this is the fact that each of the challenges we face in this epidemic are more acute for marginalised people.
It is vital to have an independent, civil society driven analysis of the COVID - 19 data for Africa, and one which connects the various issues of health, human rights, socio-economics and accountability to Africa community leaders and human rights activists. Scorecards are what we do, and we wish to support the response to COVID-19 by doing what we do best.
Long term goal
Improve accountability from African governments to respond to Corona Virus pandemic.
Short term objectives
- Provide stakeholders, especially civil society, with data analysis in the form of a Scorecard on Corona Virus outbreak in Africa for their own use and advocacy at country level.
- Highlight the linkages between the various areas of research and how they more acutely affect marginalised people in Africa.
- Identify best practices and assist on sharing to increase replication of successful tactics.
- For civil society to document the epidemic as it occurs for future learnings and advocacy, and to increase accountability
What we need from you?
If you are able to fund this work, or connect us to a potential funding source, or volunteer to help us do some of the data collection, analysis and presentation, please contact Phillipa(@)accountability.international
With over 207,000 people dead and over 3 million people testing positive for the novel Coronavirus[i] and the International Monetary Fund predicting the most severe global recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s and the World Food Programme the most severe famine since World War II, the global COVID-19 pandemic has become a pivotal moment in human history where equal access to health-care has become internationally recognised as an urgent priority.
The African continent, with its already challenged health-care systems, is over a month into experiencing its first cases of local transmission and the statistics of both new infections and death rates are alarming.
At 10am on the 21st of March, the African Union’s Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) reported 39/54 African countries with 1,021 positive tests and 23 deaths[ii]. Exactly 72 hours later at 10am on the 24th March, the same source reports 43 countries with 1,788 positive tests and 58 deaths.[iii] By April 27th the figures for 53/54 countries were 31,933 positive tests and 1,423 deaths. The Accountability International maps below demonstrate recorded deaths as a percentage of total positive tests for 24th March and one month later, 24th April.
The World Health Organisation’s Executive Director, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has criticised the African response as being too slow.[iv] Dr. Ahmed Ogwell, deputy director of the Africa CDC, has said “our health systems will not be able to cope” if African countries are not prepared for the numbers being seen in other parts of the world.[v] Ogwell has also stated that the Africa CDC is only able to provide limited support in such outbreaks due to the fact that there is a lack of financial, human and other resources provided to the institution.[vi]
In March 2020, in a candid interview Ogwell spoke about how, “with assistance from the international community and the World Health Organization (WHO), these 13 countries[vii] have had simulations of how to control a disease, but this is hardly enough.” He said: “They passed, but not with flying colours and that is going to need emergency money put aside.”[viii]
Prior to this outbreak, we have seen the exclusion of marginalized people from health care systems in Africa. For example, people work as sex workers, people who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, and trans-diverse, people with physical and mental disabilities, and differently abled persons, people with albinism, people who use drugs, and people living with HIV, as well as many other people on the margins of society.
Most of these facets of a human being usually “intersect”: for example, an HIV-positive person not having an income due to their health status and then perhaps turning to using drugs as a coping mechanism, and then being imprisoned as a result of drug use being criminalized. In the current global COVID-19 pandemic this exclusion of marginalized people becomes even more marked. For example, food security is more difficult for sex workers who are unable to work due to social distancing rules, supply chain issues affect trans-diverse people’s access to hormones, and discrimination affects drug users getting access to potable water. Never more so has it been important for us to see and work on the interconnectedness of these issues and how they affect people on the margins of society than during this pandemic.
The African response requires all stakeholders to play a role in ensuring that we minimise the numbers of deaths and permanent disabilities in Africa as this COVID-19 outbreak and the response to it evolve. It is also vital to examine what health, human rights, and socio-economic policies need to be put in place and implemented. As such AI proposes to do what we do best and have done for over 12 years: use our scorecard methodology, developed by over 100 experts globally over two years, to monitor the outbreak, and work to increase transparency and accountability by sharing this analysis with country-level policy-makers, activists, and other stakeholders for their own use for advocacy at country level.
It is vital to have an independent, civil society-driven analysis of the COVID-19 data for Africa, and one which connects the various issues of health, human rights, socioeconomics, and accountability to African community leaders and human rights activists. Scorecards are our widely-respected speciality, and we wish to support the response to COVID-19 by doing what we do best.
We have existing partnerships, all of which we plan to leverage for this work.
- The African Union Commission
- The Society for AIDS in Africa
- A wide network of civil society activists in Africa
To see the indicators we have already covered, please see our online coverage:
[vii] The 13 African countries considered most at risk due to their being transport hubs: “Egypt, Algeria, and South Africa) have moderate to high capacity to respond to outbreaks. Countries at moderate risk (ie, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya) have variable capacity and high vulnerability.” Gilbert et al, Preparedness and vulnerability of African countries against importations of COVID-19: a modelling study. Lancet 17 Feb 2020. https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2820%2930411-6
Long term goal
Improve accountability from African governments to respond to Coronavirus pandemic.
Short term objectives
- Provide stakeholders, especially civil society, with data analysis in the form of Scorecards on responses to the COVID-19 outbreak in Africa for their own use and advocacy at country level.
- Highlight the linkages between the various areas of research and how they more acutely affect a wide array of marginalized people in Africa.
- Identify best practices and assist on sharing to increase replication of successful tactics.
- For civil society to document the epidemic as it occurs for future understanding and advocacy, and to increase accountability.
Proposed areas for research
The project has three main pillars: Health, Human Rights and Economics
We are proposing Scorecard research on the following topics (this list is demonstrative but not fully inclusive; select data-sources in brackets):
- Beds & ICU beds per capita (World Bank)
- Nurses & midwives per capita (World Bank)
- Medical doctors per capita (WHO)
- HIV and access to ARVs
- Diagnosis, quarantine & treatment capacity (Intl. Health Regulations Monitoring & Evaluation Framework)
- Adequacy of medical equipment
- Health-care worker training capacity
- Pharmaceutical production capacity
- Mortuary & cremations/burials capacity
- Outpatient, aftercare, self-care & virtual medicine capacity
- Anti-viral research capacity (Global Virus Network Africa, Africa CDCs, WHO)
- The Infections Disease Vulnerability Index (IDVI)
- Importation & transmission risk
- Impact (positive or negative) on health issues such as malaria, polio (vaccination campaigns especially), tuberculosis, HIV, diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, liver and kidney disease and other chronic diseases.
- Government guidelines on accessing geographically isolated/(very)remote/indigenous communities
- Universal Health Care (UHC) data
- Relevant policy ratification at national level
- Health services corruption & theft
- Pharmaceuticals imports & exports
- Medical equipment & pharmaceutics stockout prevention
- Black market substitution of services
- Fake, expired, stolen & pirated medicines
- Human Rights
- Restrictions on civic freedoms (Intl. Centre for Not-for-profit Law)
- Militarization and abuse of restriction policies and protocols
- Key population inclusion
- Women & girls: burdens of care & gender-based violence
- Men & boys: burdens of illness & mortality
- Migration & internally displaced groups
- Prisons, incarceration & mass releases
- LGBTIQ communities
- Additional vulnerable & marginalized populations
- Criminalization of Coronavirus transmission
- Sexual & reproductive health & rights, SRHR
- Discrimination against frontline health care workers
- Other issues related to COVID-19 stigma
- Environmental rights & poverty
- Mental health rights & isolation
- Freedoms of expression & information (ICNL, FreeMuse)
- Transparency of state responses
- Scapegoating of migrants & vulnerable groups
- Impact on freedom of speech, arts and culture, and cultural heritage
- Impact on the natural environment
- Unfree/slave labour & the lack of testing
- Duty of care to unadministered regions
- TRIPs flexibilities & financing
- Oil export economies
- Import- versus export-reliant economies
- Reliance on remittances & tourism
- Food Security (IMF)
- Other supply-chain issues
- Fiscal stimulus packages (IMF)
- Percentage of GDP earmarked to fight COVID-19 (IMF)
- Water, sanitation & hygiene (WASH)
- Slums, poverty, homelessness & population density
- Job security versus layoffs
- Budget-diversion from rights-critical areas
- Virtual / remote economy issues
Accountability International will develop Scorecards on the variety of issues above, and more as they emerge. The full suite of outputs for the project are proposed to include:
Relevant Scorecard tables and Scorecard map visuals with comparative data on each of the proposed areas of research. The Scorecard contains an explanation of each of the proposed areas of research, the definition and importance of the data for the response: advocacy opportunities and community response recommendations, with a focus on marginalized communities.
We hope to be able to do webinars presenting the research and having discussants talk to the findings and recommendations. Webinars will be recorded so as to be available as a podcast as well after the actual meeting has taken place for those who cannot make the call at the exact time.
- Online Campaign
Online social media information, education, and communications campaign to share the research as broadly as possible. AI plans to request the organizers of ICASA (the largest health conference in Africa with 15,000 activists on their database) and Collectivity Community of Practice for Health Care Practitioners amongst others to also disseminate the research findings for us.
- Case Studies
Where they emerge, we will do a deeper dive and produce specific studies that will assist stakeholders in the response, for example policy guidelines for accessing remote communities.
- Academic Publications
There is a need to document this information in academic journals for others to be able to use in their research.
- Primary Data Survey
We wish to collect some of our own primary data to ensure that the voices of the most marginalized in Africa are heard.
- Long-term Analysis
AI hopes to do longer term analyses of the issues that are arising for a number of reasons, some of which are: a) as a documentary record of the pandemic, b) so that human rights gains and challenges are tracked and understood, with their implications for future epidemiological application, c) to use for advocacy for long-term policy improvements and d) to ensure marginalization becomes part of the broader policy discussion in the post-peak/post-pandemic era.
- Consulting experts 50 topics: 2 days each to advise on excellent sources of data, collect and collate and analyze it.
- AI will then provide Scorecard methodology and communications support as well as accountability lens analysis.
- AI staff time to work designing and analyzing the data, collaborating with experts and finalizing the accountability lens and liaising with partners, as well as planning webinars and hosting them.
Expert consultants’ honorarium: 100 USD per day x 2 days x 50 topics/experts = 10 000 USD
AI research and coordination time:
Research Director (30%), 12 months: 28 000 USD
Project Manager (100%), 12 months: 40 000 USD
Researcher (50%), 12 months: 20,000 USD
Part-time financial management and auditing costs: 12,000 USD
Comms manager (30%): for 10 months: 15 000 USD
Design and layout/graphic design, comms promotions costs and boosts and purchase of images: 20 000 USD
Admin 8% 11 600 USD
Total: 156 600 USD
The above is ideally how we would like to run the project long term, but we will adjust according to the investment we receive.
PLEASE NOTE/ WE ARE ALSO EXAMINING THE MERIT OF CREATING AN ONLINE LIVE DASHBOARD AND AN ONLINE SURVEY ON COVID-19 AS PART OF THIS WORK. IF YOU ARE INTERESTED, PLEASE CONTACT US.